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ARGUMENT 
A. Setting aside default and denial of motion for default judgment. 
Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation dba St. Mark's Hospital ("St. 
Mark's") was served in May 2007 with a Notice of Intention to Commence 
an Action by Roth. [R336] St. Mark's through its attorneys stipulated that a 
proceeding before the Department of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing ("DOPL") would serve no purpose [R68] which provided for a 
certificate of compliance to be issued by DOPL so that Roth could file his 
lawsuit. [R336] On March 31, 2008 St. Mark's attorneys received the 
Summons and Complaint dated January 17, 2008. [R68] (Emphasis 
added) The Summons on its face stated that an answer was due within 30 
days of service. [R28]. The only reason given for the failure to file an 
answer to the Summons and Complaint was a non-attorney in the attorneys 
office incorrectly calendared the due date at 45 days. [R68 and 76-77]. 
There is no dispute that St. Mark's did not file a timely answer. [See page 6 
of St. Mark's Brief acknowledging the due date to answer as April 24, 2008 
and they did not file until May 9, 2008]. 
St. Mark's opens its Argument at page 19 of its Appellee Brief 
arguing that a trial court is endowed considerable discretion in granting 
or denying motions to set aside a default. Roth agrees. St. Mark's cites 
some cases, mainly federal cases that make relief from a default easier to 
obtain than relief from a default judgment and argues that it would be an 
abuse of the court in not granting relief in a case like the one before this 
Court based upon this less stringent requirement for granting relief. 
However, this is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court decision cited in 
Roth's Brief at pg 22, concluding that Rule 60(b) criteria are applicable to 
demonstrate "good cause" under Rule 55(c), See Gold Standard. Inc. v. 
American Barrick Resources Corp.. 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990) and does 
not square with a recent decision of this Court. In Davis v. Goldsworthv. 
184 P.3d 626 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) in a case involving a default, like St. 
Mark's claim in this case, Goldsworthy's theory was essentially one of 
excusable neglect. This Court in Davis v. Goldsworthv. at 630 id. "To 
demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect, '[t]he movant 
must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.'" Citing Black's 
Title. Inc.. 1999 UT App. 330, |10, 991 P.2d 607 (quoting Airkem 
Intermountain. Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973). "Absent such a 
showing, [a defaulting party['s assertion does not demonstrate his neglect 
was excusable." Id. 
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All that the Trial Court had to go on was that the answer was not filed 
by the deadline and that the only excuse was that a non-attorney staff 
member for HPS calendared the response date at 45 instead of the required 
30 days. There was absolutely no requisite showing of due diligence after 
the attorneys received the summons and complaint and no showing or even 
suggestion of any kind that HPS was prevented from appearing by 
circumstances over which they had no control. 
This Court should follow its own precedence as it declared under 
similar circumstances in Davis v. Goldsworthy, at 630, id. "reverse and 
remand to the trial court for the detailed findings required by Utah case law 
and for such orders as may then be appropriate." 
B. Discovery of legal injury through due diligence. 
Dr. Joseph appears to argue that the burden is on Roth to overcome 
the trial court's determination that he discovered his legal injury on October 
13, 2004 or at least by January 5, 2005. However, this burden is and has 
been Dr. Joseph's to establish. See Conder v. Hunt. 2000 UT App 105,114, 
1 P.3d 558, cert denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). 114 "As with any 
affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of proving every element 
necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [plaintiffs] claim." 
Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996). See Stewart v. K & S 
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Co., 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979); Slavden v. Sixta. 250 Kan. 23, 825 
P.2d 119, 122 (1992) (stating "the burden of pleading and proving" statute of 
limitation's applicability "rests on the defendant"). 
Dr. Joseph argues that since Roth obtained his medical records on 
January 5, 2005 the statute of limitations was triggered by at least this date if 
not the earlier date of October 13, 2004 when Roth admittedly learned of his 
physical injury. It appears from Dr. Joseph's argument that he is claiming 
that Roth learned of his legal injury on October 13, 2004 when he dis-
covered that the polypectomy site was not removed during surgery. 
However, all this establishes is that Roth learned of his physical injury, but 
in no way equates to his discovery of his legal injury. The statute of limita-
tions that Dr. Joseph is seeking to invoke is U.C.A. §78B-3-404(l). It 
provides ".. .malpractice action... shall be commenced within two years 
after...patient discovers,.. .the injury..." "Injury" (legal injury) is defined as 
discovery of injury and the negligence that caused the injury. Foil v. 
Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144, 148-9 (Utah 1979). As for obtaining medical re-
cords on January 5, 2005, it is an incredulous claim that this established the 
day Roth knew of his legal injury. This would be like handing someone 
who does not know Arabic the Quran written in Arabic and then claiming 
that as of that date they were aware of the teachings of Muhammad. 
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The law in Utah is clear that in order to invoke the statute of limita-
tions in this case, short of Dr. Joseph delineating some definitive event or 
date that clearly demonstrates Roth learned of his legal injury, it is for the 
jury to conclude when this occurred or should have occurred through due di-
ligence. The Utah Supreme Court in a recent case, Daniels v. Gamma West 
Brachvtherapv. 2009 UT 66, p i , 221 P.3d 256 (2009) declared, 
Tying the statute of limitations' trigger to the discovery 
of the cause-in-fact of a patient's injury does not leave 
health care professionals endlessly susceptible to revived 
claims. Instead, the discovery rule is tempered by a 
requirement that a patient act with reasonable diligence in 
investigating a suspected injury. Thus, the statute of 
limitations begins when exercising such diligence a patient 
should have discovered his injury and its possible negligent 
cause. Whether and when a patient should have discovered 
an injury and its cause is a fact intensive question that 
requires a jury to determine, given the information available, 
whether the actions taken in response to an injury and the 
efforts extended to discover its cause were adequate. 
The one record in these voluminous medical records that Dr. Joseph is 
"hanging his hat on" is an obscure office note of Dr. Voorhees in June 2004. 
By itself it does not really shed light on any determination that a negligent 
act occurred. At best it may lead one to further inquiry as to its meaning. 
That is exactly what Roth proceeded to do. He made inquiry through the 
depositions of Dr. Joseph and Dr. Voorhees in January 2007 as to the 
meaning of problems involving the tattoo ink. 
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In this case it is for the jury to determine when Roth through due dili-
gence should have discovered his legal injury. As we learned from the 
Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, case at | 31 , in order for the jury to 
make this determination they also need to know ".. ..which event it is evalu-
ating for whether the plaintiff was aware or should have been aware of what 
was the negligent cause of his injury." Roth on Octpber 13, 2004 was led 
by Dr. Joseph to believe that the surgeon was responsible [R236 [^19] caus-
ing Roth to concentrate on this causal event, the May 24, 2004 surgery, and 
not look at Dr. Joseph's April 28, 2004 treatment. 
C. Discovery of Legal injury - Issue Preclusion 
Dr. Joseph argues issue preclusion based upon Judge Lindberg's 
ruling in the Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App. 313 (unpublished) (attached 
hereto in the Appendix). The trial court dismissed this case based upon its 
determination that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004 and 
therefore his filing his statutory notice to commence an action and suit in 
2008 was more than two years from this date and therefore the statute of 
limitations had run. This Court affirmed the dismissal; however, upon 
different grounds than applied by the Trial Court. This Court rejected the 
determination that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004 and 
instead determined that by at least the time he initiated a malpractice action 
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against the surgeon he had discovered his legal injury, some nineteen 
months later. See Roth v. Pedersen. pg 3 of this Court's unpublished 
Memorandum Decision (Appendix). In order to use issue preclusion to 
establish that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004, such 
prior position must have been successful, and in the prior case it was not. 
See 3D Constr. & Dev.. L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co.. 2005 UT App 
307,111, 117 P.3d 1082, 1085-86 "Under judicial estoppel, fa person may 
not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position taken in a prior 
judicial proceeding between the same persons or their privies involving the 
same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully maintained.'" 
Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n. 2001 UT 74,126, 34 P.3d 180 (quoting 
Tracv Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co.. 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 
390(1942)). 
Furthermore, Dr. Joseph in his Brief at page 28 sets forth the criteria 
that must be met before issue preclusion is applied, citing Oman v. Davis 
School District 2008 UT 70,129, 194 P.3d 956. 
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been 
a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in 
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Roth is the party in both suits for which Dr. Joseph seeks issue 
preclusion, so element (i) is met and the memorandum decision in the prior 
appeal "resulted in a final judgment on the merits." See State v. Baker. 176 
P.3d 493, 496 (Utah App. 2008); thus, element (ii) is met. The litigation 
however, was never completely and fully litigated in that there was no 
hearings conducted, there was no evidence provided to the Court, and in this 
jury case no jury was impaneled. Thus element (iii) was not met and as for 
element (ii) the issue decided is not identical to the issue in the matter at 
hand. Dr. Pedersen was sued for alleged malpractice that occurred in a 
surgical procedure on May 24, 2004; whereas, Dr. Joseph is being sued for 
medical malpractice related to his treatment in a separate causal event in 
April 2004. 
Not withstanding the foregoing argument, the final decision on the 
merits in Roth v. Pedersen. pg. 3, id, concluded that Roth discovered his 
legal injury by May 2006 and as such the statute of limitations in this case 
would have similarly run in May 2008, some four months after Roth filed 
suit against Dr. Joseph and St. Mark's. 
D. Concealment 
Where the June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorhees to Dr. Joseph plays a 
significant role in this case is that it represents information that Dr. Joseph 
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had a duty to disclose to Roth after receipt of the letter from Dr. Voorhees. 
Dr. Joseph was absolutely required to inform Roth that he was experiencing 
problems with the SPOT ink used to tattoo Roth's polypectomy site and that 
it was likely Dr. Voorhees failed to remove this cancerous site in the May 
24, 2004 surgery, which information was critical for Roth in determining 
how to proceed in protecting his body. A doctor does have a common law 
fiduciary duty "to disclose to his patient any material information 
concerning the patient's physical condition." Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 
348, 354 (Utah 1980). See Daniels, 2009 UT 66. | 5 1 . The question of what 
is "material information" is for the jury. Nixdorf v. Hicken at 354, id. 
Roth testified in his affidavit herein, that the first he became aware of 
the June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorhees to Dr. Joseph was during the 
deposition of Dr. Joseph in 2007. The fact this letter was not in Dr. Joseph's 
medical records certainly raises a question for the jury as to why Dr. Joseph 
concealed this letter from Roth. This certainly raises a material issue of fact. 
Dr. Joseph argues that Roth's argument of fraudulent concealment is 
baseless and Roth was required to prove that Dr. Joseph affirmatively acted 
to conceal. The law is clear in Utah that a doctor has a duty to disclose to 
his patient material medical information. Nixdorf v. Hicken. at 354 id 
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The Court in Charlesworth v. Revns. 113 P.3d 1031, 1037 (UTApp. 2005) 
stated, "A fiduciary's breach of the 'duty to speak the truth' is sufficient to 
establish fraudulent concealment. Russell/Packard Dev.. Inc. v. Carsoa 78 
P.3d 616, affdas to result, 108 P.3d 741, 752 (quoting Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hosp.. 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989)), 
Dr. Joseph states that where fraudulent concealment is alleged the 
circumstances forming the basis of the allegation must be stated with 
particularity. Roth has stated acts of fraudulent concealment with 
particularity. Roth pointed to Dr. Joseph's knowledge of the problems the 
surgeon experienced in the botched surgery, that it related to his failure to 
properly tattoo the polypectomy site, his failure to disclose his 
miscommunication to the surgeon as to the location of the polypectomy site 
and his failure to disclose to Roth that the surgeon asked Dr. Joseph to 
promptly perform a colonoscopy in order to determine if the polypectomy 
site had been removed as he was concerned that it might not have been. 
[Rl-8]. Dr. Joseph much like the defendant Dr. Veasy in Chapman v. 
Primary Children's Hospital 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), misdirected Roth 
away from looking at him for malpractice [R236 [^19] and although aware 
of critical medical information that he was required and had a duty to 
disclose to Roth, he remained silent (concealment). "In this case, however, 
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the Chapmansf complaint, though drafted in an admittedly 'scattershot' 
fashion, contains the averments that defendants withheld information 
regarding the cause of Jennifer's injuries and 'misinformed [the Chapmans] 
by, among other things, advising them that the brain damage sustained by 
Jennifer Chapman was an unavoidable event which was not caused by any 
misconduct on the part of any of the defendants.' This is a sufficiently clear 
and specific description of the facts underlying the Chapmans' claim of 
fraudulent concealment to support our conclusion that the requirement of 
rule 9(b) has been met. See Peteler v. Robison. 81 Utah 535, 553, 17 P.2d 
244, 250 (1932)." Roth respectfully submits that he has as well made 
sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts underlying his claim of 
fraudulent concealment to support a conclusion that the requirement of Rule 
9(b) has been met. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not make the requisite findings to support St. 
Mark's request for relief for excusable neglect, specifically no findings were 
made and interestingly nothing was provided by St. Mark's showing due 
diligence and that it was prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which it had no control. This Court should reverse the Trial Court's setting 
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aside the Default Certificate and remand for the detailed findings required by 
Utah case law and for such orders as may then be appropriate. 
The Order granting Summary Judgment must be reversed as genuine 
issues of material fact exist as to when Roth discovered or through due 
diligence should have discovered his legal injury. Specifically there is 
actually no date provided in the Record that establishes Roth's discovery of 
both the causal event and the negligence which caused his physical injury. 
As to when he should have through due diligence discovered the causal 
event and the negligence is a fact intensive matter for the jury to determine. 
The Order granting Summary Judgment must be reversed as a genuine issue 
of material fact exists as to whether Roth was prevented from discovering 
his legal injury because of the alleged fraudulent concealment of Dr. Joseph. 
Issue preclusion is inapplicable in this case and does not support the 
summary judgment entered herein. 
For these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand on the 
granting of Rule 60(b) relief to St. Mark's and allow the Trial Court to make 
such findings under Utah law as to whether or not St. Mark's can 
demonstrate that their failure to timely file an answer to the Complaint was 
due to excusable neglect. This Court should reverse the Summary Judgment 
entered in favor of the defendants and allow a jury to decide when Roth 
discovered the causal event and negligence that caused his injury and/or 
12 
determine whether there was fraudulent concealment in order for the Trial 
Court to then be able to determine whether the statute of limitations ran or 
had not run in this case. 
DATED this 24th day of March 2010. 
David E. Ross II 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
Roth v. Pedersen. 2009 UT App. 313. 
Entered October 29, 2009, as an unpublished Memorandum Decision 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Larry Roth, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Peder J. Pedersen, M.D., 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COUF 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Casfje No. 20090139-CA 
F T T F D 
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2009 UT App 313 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 0809^.7484 
The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg 
Attorneys: David E. Ross II, Park City, for Appellant 
Dennis C. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Orme, and McHugh. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Larry Roth appeals the trial court's grant of Dr. Peder J. 
Pedersen's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed 
with prejudice Roth's medical malpractice claim against Pedersen. 
We affirm. 
Whether a motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly 
granted is a question of law, which we review for correctness. 
See MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Williams, 2006 UT App 432, % 2, 147 
P.3d 536. "When reviewing a grant of [such] a motion . . . , 
this court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true; we then consider such allegations and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs." Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. Department of 
Transp., 2004 UT App 405, \ 7, 103 P.3d 716 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Further, "[tjhe applicability of a statute of 
limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are 
[also] questions of law, which we review for correctness." 
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, \ 18, 108 P.3d 
741 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Roth argues that the trial court improperly considered 
materials outside the pleadings to conclude that the two-year 
statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice claim 
ajainst Pedersen had expired. Specifically, he claims the trial 
court considered Pedersen's memorandum supporting his motion for 
judgment to extrapolate the date upon which Roth first became 
aware of his legal injury. In reviewing a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, a trial court may only consider the pleadings. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c); see also id. R. 7(a) (listing the 
following pleadings: complaint, answer, reply to a counterclaim, 
answer to a cross-claim, third party complaint, and third party 
answer). "'If a court does not exclude material outside the 
pleadings and fails to convert a rule 12 [ (c)] motion to one for 
summary judgment, it is reversible error unless the dismissal can 
be justified without considering the outside documents.'" Tuttle 
v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, K 6, 155 P.3d 893 (quoting Oakwood 
Vill., LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, % 12, 104 P.3d 
1226) .1 Although we agree that the trial court relied upon 
material outside of the pleadings in "finding" that Roth became 
aware of the legal injury on October 13, 2004, we nevertheless 
uphold the order granting the motion because "'the dismissal can 
be justified without considering the outside document [],'" see 
id. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the Act) requires an 
action to be commenced within two years "after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(l) (2008). The Utah Supreme Court has 
"repeatedly interpreted the phrase 'discovered the injury' as 
meaning discovering the 'injury and the negligence which resulted 
in the injury,' also referred to as 'legal injury.'" Daniels v. 
Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, f 25, 640 Utah Adv. Rep. 
8 (quoting Foil v. Ballincrer, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979)); see 
also Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (Utah 1987) ("[T]he 
plaintiff must know of the injury and of the negligence which 
caused the injury."); Foil, 601 P.2d at 148 ("[T]he two-year 
1. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, 155 P.3d 893, addresses the 
same question in the context of a motion to dismiss under rule 
12(b) (6). See id. f 7. However, because "[t]he Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure contain identical provisions for converting 
motions under rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) into motions for summary 
judgment," id. f 7 n.l, the same standard of review applies for a 
12(c) motion as for one under 12(b)(6). 
2. For the convenience of the reader, we reference the 2008 
codification of section 78B-3-404 because the renumbered statute 
contains language identical to the version in effect when Roth's 
cause of action arose. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404 amendment 
notes (2008) (noting that statute had been renumbered and 
reorganized but no substantive changes were made). 
20090139-CA 2 
provision does not commence to run until the injured person knew 
or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the 
injury was caused by negligent action."). 
In his complaint, Roth avers that he underwent resection 
surgery in May 2004 to remove a cancerous section of his colon. 
The affected area had been marked by tattoos to assist with the 
resection. Roth further alleges that six months after the 
resection surgery, the doctor who had first identified the 
cancerous polyps, and the doctors who performed a second 
colonoscopy saw the original tattoo markings, indicating that the 
wrong area of Roth's colon had been removed during the May 2 0 04 
resection surgery. Roth also asserts that he had a second 
surgery to remove the correct site. The answer states that the 
date of that surgery was January 24, 2005.1 
It is clear from the pleadings that Roth was aware that a 
legal injury had occurred at least by the time he initiated legal 
action against the general surgeon in May 2006. Thus, Roth knew 
both that he had suffered a legal injury and that it had happened 
during the resection surgery. That awareness triggered the 
statute of limitations regardless of whether Roth knew the 
precise identity of the wrongdoer. See McDougal v. Weed, 945 
P.2d 175, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting the Act to start 
the statute of limitations once a plaintiff or patient discovers 
that an injury has occurred and that injury was likely the result 
of negligence, not upon the establishment of the identity of the 
person responsible); see also Daniels, 2009 UT 66, % 28 ("Under 
McDougal \ v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)], a 
plaintiff need not know the identity of the responsible 
tortfeasor, but must know which medical event allegedly caused 
his injury."). 
Nevertheless, Roth neglected to file his complaint against 
Pedersen until August 2008, some three months after the statute 
of limitations had expired.3 Accordingly, we conclude that the 
grant of the motion for judgment and subsequent dismissal were 
appropriate because Roth failed, as required by the Act, to 
commence litigation within two years of discovery of his legal 
injury, which occurred, at the very latest, in May 2006. See 
3. Roth did serve a notice of intent to commence legal action on 
Pedersen on January 12, 2008. However, where the notice is 
served more than ninety days prior to the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, the action must actually be commenced 
within the two-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-3-412(4) (extending the statute of limitations only where 
notice is filed within the statute of limitations but less than 
ninety days prior to its expiration). 
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generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(l) (prescribing the statute 
of limitations for malpractice actions). 
Roth alternately contends that the trial court erred in 
concluding that the statute of limitations had expired pursuant 
to subsection (1) of Utah Code section 78E-3-404 (1), see id. 
§ 786-3-404(1), because he alleged fraudulent concealment, which 
is governed by subsection (2)(b) of that section, see id. § 78B-
3-404(2) (b) . Subsection (2) (b) provides, 
[W]here it is alleged that a patient has been 
prevented from discovering misconduct on the 
part of a health care provider because that 
health care provider has affirmatively acted 
to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless 
commenced within one year after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered 
the fraudulent concealment, whichever first 
occurs. 
Id. Pedersen counters that Roth's fraudulent concealment claim 
must fail because Roth did not state his claim with particularity 
as required by rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
see Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) (stating that in allegations of fraud, 
the "circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with 
particularity"); see also Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 
784 P.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Utah 1989) (requiring a plaintiff 
pleading fraudulent concealment under the Act to comply with rule 
9(b)'s particularity requirements). Pedersen correctly concedes 
that "[a] fraud allegation made on information and belief is 
adequate under rule 9(b), 'as long as it includes the facts upon 
which the belief is based.'" Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 
85, % 24, 69 P.3d 286 (quoting Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, 
906 F. Supp 1470, 1476 (D. Utah 1994)). However, "mere 
conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation 
of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude 
dismissal or summary judgment." Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1186. 
Pedersen asserts that Roth's fraudulent concealment claim 
consists of a single unsupported conclusory allegation. In this 
allegation, Roth claims that he obtained information in August 
2 0 07, from which 
it appears that Dr. Pedersen concealed the 
fact that he failed to properly consult with 
[the general surgeon] in May 2004 as to the 
reasons the tattooing may not have been 
identified, the reasons the polypectomy site 
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could not be seen[,] and [to inform him that] 
the area requiring surgery remained 
[unremoved]. 
Roth argues that he incorporated by reference other factual 
statements made earlier in the complaint to support his 
allegation of fraudulent concealment. These factual averments 
suggest that Pedersen both knew about the problems with ink 
fading, the discrepancy between the doctors regarding the 
tattoos' locations, and the reasons why the polypectomy site may 
not be visible, and neglected to convey that knowledge to the 
general surgeon. Roth claims that this failure to speak was a 
breach of the fiduciary duty owed by Pedersen as Roth's 
physician. See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 
(Utah 1997) ("Fraudulent concealment requires that one with a 
legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts remain 
silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts."); Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (noting that doctors have a 
fiduciary duty to their patients to disclose "any material 
information concerning the patient's physical condition"); see 
also Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapv, LLC, 2009 UT 66, Iff 50-
51, 640 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (reaffirming physician's fiduciary 
obligation to keep patient apprised of his physical condition 
post-treatment). 
Even assuming that a fiduciary duty to reveal this 
information existed because of Pedersen's medical partnership 
with Roth's original doctor and his provision of medical care to 
Roth, Roth fails to allege that Pedersen "affirmatively acted to 
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct" from Roth, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2) (b) (2008). Indeed, Roth neither avers 
that he ever consulted with Pedersen about the May 2 004 resection 
surgery nor alleges that Pedersen ever provided Roth with 
information that misrepresented or concealed his involvement in 
the surgery. He also does not claim that due to Pedersen's 
failure to disclose, the general surgeon misrepresented the 
problems that arose during surgery or the outcome.4 Furthermore, 
nowhere in the complaint does Roth allege that he was precluded 
from further discussing the surgery with or deposing the general 
surgeon from whose August 2 007 testimony he learned of Pedersen's 
lack of disclosure.5 Without such factual allegations, Roth's 
4. In fact, the answer states that the general surgeon informed 
Roth that neither he nor Pedersen could see the tattoos but that 
the general surgeon believed he had removed the correct portion 
of Roth's colon. 
5. The general surgeon testified that in June 2004, he discussed 
(continued...) 
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fraudulent concealment claim is nothing more than a mere 
conclusory allegation that is insufficient to preclude dismissal. 
See Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1186 (permitting dismissal where 
conclusory allegations were not supported by facts). 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of this claim 
for failure to plead fraud with sufficient particularity. 
Because the two-year statute of limitations for filing a 
medical malpractice claim expired at the latest in May 2008, the 
trial court properly dismissed Roth's August 2 008 complaint on a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Additionally, Roth failed 
to plead fraudulent concealment with particularity as required by 
rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we 
affirm the dismissal with prejudice. 
WE CONCUR: 
5. (...continued) 
with Roth's original doctor the lack of disclosure from 
Pedersen's office regarding the ink fading problems. 
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